Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After \u3cem\u3eStone v. Powell\u3c/em\u3e by Halpern, Philip
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1982 
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After 
Stone v. Powell 
Philip Halpern 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1 (1982). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/103 
This article originally appeared at 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1982). Reprinted by permission. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. 82 JANUARY 1982 NO. 1
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell
Philip Halpern*
In Stone v. Powell' the Supreme Court severely limited litigation of
fourth amendment claims by state prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. Specifically, Stone held that convictions obtained by use of evidence
procured through a violation of the fourth amendment are not ordinarily open
to attack on habeas corpus. There was an exception, however: habeas review
would be available where the state had not provided a defendant with an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" of a search and seizure claim.2 The
Court did not elaborate on the content of the qualification and, more basi-
cally, did not set forth a theoretical justification. Absent such guidance or
justification, lower federal courts have encountered formidable difficulties in
defining the permissible limits of collateral review of fourth amendment
exclusionary rule claims under the exception.
3
It has been said of Stone that its significance extends well beyond fourth
amendment habeas corpus litigation, that it is a "harbinger of future eviscera-
tions ' ' 4 of habeas corpus jurisdiction over constitutional claims unrelated to
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, B.A. 1968, Columbia
College; J.D. 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
I would like to thank Lee Albert and Al Katz of the State Univeisity of New York for their
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
2. Id. at 482, 494.
3. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where Justice Marshall remarked in his
concurrence: "The Stone holding has not eased the burden on the lower federal courts as much as
the Stone majority might have hoped, since those courts have had to struggle over what this court
meant by 'an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim'. . . ." Id. at
404 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring).
4. 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in a bitter dissent, accused the
majority of having rewritten the habeas corpus statutes to deny federal collateral relief for
constitutional violations that are unrelated to the reliability of the factfinding process.
[T]he real ground for today's decision-a ground that is particularly troubling in
light of its portent for habeas jurisdiction generally-is the Court's novel reinterpreta-
tion of the habeas statutes; this would read the statutes as requiring the district courts
routinely to deny habeas relief to prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws ... of the United States" as a matter of judicial "discretion" . . . because such
claims are "different in kind" from other constitutional violations in that they "do not
'impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process,' "... and because application of such
constitutional strictures "often frees the guilty." . . . Much in the Court's opinion
suggests that a construction of the habeas statutes to deny relief for non-"guilt-related"
constitutional violations, based on this Court's vague notions of comity and federalism
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the integrity of the guilt-determination process, and, moreover, that the rea-
soning of the decision logically dictates complete abandonment of the exclu-
sionary rule. 5 Contrary to these expectations, however, there has been no
general curtailment of habeas corpus jurisdiction over constitutional claims
unrelated to the reliability of the fact-finding process," and the exclusionary
rule has remained substantially intact since Stone was decided in 1976.
7
Building on the reasoning and logic of Stone, this Article seeks to develop
a theoretical justification in support of a system of limited federal habeas
corpus review of fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims, and to define
the conditions under which such review should occur. Additionally, the Ar-
ticle considers the implications of Stone for continued enforcement of the
exclusionary rule and for federal collateral review of non-fourth amendment
claims.
Part I examines the legal and factual propositions considered in Stone,
which provide the framework for understanding the exception as well as the
decision's other implications. Part II discusses and criticizes various under-
... is the actual premise for today's decision . . . . For we are told that "[riesort to
habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no innocent person
suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values impor-
tant to our system of government." . . . We are told that federal determination of
Fourth Amendment claims merely involves "an issue that has no bearing on the basic
justice of [the defendant's] incarceration." . . . and that "the ultimate question [in the
criminal process should invariably be] guilt or innocence."
Id. at 515-17 (citations tothe majority opinion omitted).
Some commentators share this view of the Stone majority opinion. See, e.g., Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1086-87
(1977). But see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Columi. L. Rev. 436, 450-59 (1980).
5. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Stone, observed a need for "overruling this judicially
contrived doctrine-or limiting its scope to egregious, bad-faith conduct." 428 U.S. at 501
(Burger, C.J., concurring). He characterized the majority's statement that expressed continued
adherence to implementing the exclusionary rule at trial and on appeal, id. at 492, as coming
"[b]y way of dictum, and somewhat hesitantly." Id. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (refusing to extend Stone's holding to a grand
jury discrimination claim).
7. This is not to say, however, that the exclusionary rule has flourished under the Burger
Court. Prior to Stone, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), ruled that a witness could
not object to grand jury questioning based on information obtained through a fourth amendment
violation. In addition, the Court has maintained its unwillingness to extend the exclusionary rule
beyond the confines of the criminal trial. For example, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976), decided the same day as Stone, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to an I.R.S.
civil assessment proceeding where local police had engaged in an illegal search. Also, in post-
Stone decisions, the Court has declined to extend the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the
testimony of a witness, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); refused to suppress
evidence obtained in a search pursuant to an arrest in good faith under a "presumptively valid"
statute when the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979); permitted the Government to use illegally obtained, and otherwise inadmissible,
evidence to impeach a defendant's responses to cross-examination, United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980); and held that the federal courts may not invoke their supervisory power over
federal law enforcement to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment rights
of third parties other than the defendants before them, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980). The fact remains, however, that it is still the law that state and federal prosecutors may
not use evidence obtained as a direct result of a violation of a defendant's fourth amendment
rights as part of the case in chief against him.
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standings of the exception by the lower federal courts. Part III explicates a
theory to explain Stone's ban on fourth amendment habeas litigation and the
exception thereto. Part IV proposes a standard for determining the availabil-
ity of collateral review under Stone. Part V considers Stone's significance in
areas beyond fourth amendment habeas litigation.
I. STONE V. POWELL
A. The Decisions
Stone v. Powell8 and Wolff v. Rice9 were companion cases in the Su-
preme Court. The respondent in Stone, Lloyd Powell, was convicted of
second-degree murder in a California court as a result of a homicide commit-
ted during an attempted holdup of a liquor store. The prosecution introduced
into evidence a revolver, said to be the murder weapon, which was found in
Powell's possession ten hours after the homicide when he was searched inci-
dent to his arrest in Henderson, Nevada, for violation of a local vagrancy
ordinance. The state courts rejected Powell's contention that the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and that, therefore, the revolver and
the testimony of a Henderson police officer concerning its discovery should be
suppressed as fruits of an unconstitutional arrest.' 0 Subsequently, the federal
district court denied the respondent's request for habeas corpus relief. The
court gave two reasons for this denial: first, that the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule would not be served by suppressing the fruits of an otherwise
valid arrest under an unconstitutional statute; and, second, that the error, if
any, was harmless." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.'
2
While conceding that exclusion would not deter police officers from making
an arrest in good faith pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the appellate
court maintained that legislatures should be deterred from enacting unconsti-
tutional statutes.
The respondent in Wolff, David Rice, was convicted in a Nebraska state
court of first-degree murder in connection with the bombing death of an
Omaha police officer. At his trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence
dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials that had been used in the con-
struction of explosive devices and had been found in a search of Rice's home.
Rice sought to have this evidence excluded, contending that the warrant
authorizing the search was invalid because of an insufficient suporting affida-
vit. The Nebraska trial court denied his motion to suppress, and the Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed.' 3 The district court granted Rice's petition for
8. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
9. Id. The cases were consolidated on certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.
10. The trial court was the only state court to reach the merits. The California court of
appeal affirmed on the ground of harmless error, and the California Supreme Court denied
review. 428 U.S. at 470.
11. Id. at 470-71.
12. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
1982]
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habeas corpus, having found that the warrant indeed was invalid. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 15
The Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in both
cases, and held that
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search
and seizure was introduced at his trial.' 6
The federal habeas corpus statute mandates relief to state prisoners held
"in custody in violation of the Constitution."1 7 According to the Court, a
person convicted on the basis of illegally seized evidence is not held in uncon-
stitutional custody, because the exclusionary rule is not founded on a personal
constitutional right of the accused. Instead, it is a judge-made remedial mea-
sure designed to deter the police from engaging in unconstitutional searches
and seizures.' 8 Consequently, the Court stated, a determination of the avail-
ability of habeas corpus relief for search and seizure claims necessitates a
balancing of the incremental deterrent benefits attainable from providing such
relief against the attendant social costs. 19 Concluding that the costs of federal
habeas relief would outweigh its benefits, the Court banned habeas corpus
consideration of fourth amendment claims except where the state did not
provide "an opportunity for full and fair litigation." 20
The Court divided 6-3 in four opinions. 2 1  The majority, despite its
holding, explicitly reaffirmed continued adherence to compulsory state appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule at trial and on appeal. 22 The Chief Justice, in
a concurrence, advocated the rule's total repudiation for lack of proof that
14. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974).
15. 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
16. 428 U.S. at 482. The grants of certiorari, 428 U.S. at 474 n.5, appeared to invite
arguments regarding the appropriateness or necessity of exclusion in these cases in light of their
particular facts. Indeed, the principal arguments in petitioners' briefs to the Supreme Court were
that the exclusionary rule should not apply because the police acted in good faith. Brief for Wolff
petitioner at 9, 21-35; Brief for Stone petitioner at 2, 11-39. In Stone the police relied on a
presumptively valid ordinance and in Wolff on a presumptively valid search warrant. The fault, if
any, in Stone was that of the legislature in enacting an unconstitutional statute, and in Wolff was
that of the magistrate in issuing a search warrant on the basis of a defective affidavit. Subse-
quently, in Michigan v. DeFillippo. 443 U.S. 31 (1979), the Court held that a search incident to an
arrest made in good faith reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional is not invalidated by
the subsequent declaration of unconstitutionality.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
18. 428 U.S. at 486-89.
19. Id. at 488.
20. Id. at 482, 494.
21. Justice Powell authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens. The Chief Justice wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion, as
did Justice White.
22. 428 U.S. at 493.
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exclusion actually deters official misconduct.23 Justice Brennan, in a vehe-
ment dissent, charged the majority with having usurped Congress's power to
define the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction.24  Justice White's dissent
urged that the remedy should be available on collateral review, so long as state
defendants are constitutionally entitled to invoke the exclusionary remedy for
fourth amendment violations at trial and on appeal.2 5 Justice White, how-
ever, would not apply the exclusionary rule where the police have acted
reasonably and in good faith.26
B. The Legal Predicate
The legal predicate for the Court's cost-benefit analysis is that the exclu-
sionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but rather a remedial device
designed primarily to deter police violations of the fourth amendment.2 7 The
majority recognized that the "imperative of judicial integrity" has been often
mentioned in justification of exclusion. 28 This rationale, however, did not
figure independently into the Court's analysis, because judicial integrity is not
offended merely by the admission of unlawfully seized evidence. Rather, the
offense occurs when such admission provides an incentive for the police to
engage in unconstitutional conduct. Consequently, judicial integrity analysis
differs little from deterrence analysis.29
Deterrence, however, was not always the linchpin for exclusion of ille-
gally seized evidence. In 1914 the Court unanimously adopted an exclusionary
rule for federal proceedings in Weeks v. United States3" without mentioning
23. Id. at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
24. Id. at 515-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 536-42 (White, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 486.
28. See 428 U.S. at 484-85, and accompanying citations.
29. Id. at 485. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976), described the collapse of judicial integrity into deterrence:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of evidentiary rules is
that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution .... The
focus ... must be on the question whether the admission of the evidence encourages
violations of Fourth Amendment rights . . . [T]his inquiry is essentially the same as the
inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose.
Id. at 458 n.35. But see United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980) (exclusionary rule
serves 'two-fold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity").
The identification of the judicial integrity rationale with the instrumentalist deterrence
justification was foreshadowed in the early and classic statement of the judicial integrity rationale
by Justice Brandeis in his dissent on Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). On one
hand, Brandeis noted that judicial exclusiop of evidence obtained through the illegal acts of
government agents is necessary as an end in itself-to avoid judicial "contamination." Id. at 484
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). On the other hand, he recognized that it is a means "to maintain
respect for law ... [and] to promote confidence in the administration of justice." Id. For an
interesting discussion of the collapse of judicial integrity as an independently functioning justifi-
cation for the exclusionary rule, see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule
as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 263-88 (1974).
30. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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deterrence. 31  Deterrence was first acknowledged some thirty-five years later
in Wolf v. Colorado,32 in which the Court declined to apply the Weeks rule to
the states. Exclusion was considered as but one among several means available
to the states to effectuate the substantive protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 33 Wolf was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,34 in which the Court held that
the states were required by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to
exclude illegally seized evidence. Deterrence was one of several justifications
presented for exclusion. 35 Exclusion was also described as an "essential part
of the right to privacy ' 36 guaranteed by fourteenth amendment due process;
as necessary to prevent the use of evidence that is "tantamount to coerced
testimony"; 37 and as a measure to preserve judicial integrity. 38  Deterrence
plainly was not the sole or primary basis for exclusion. The Court in Mapp
noted that the failure of the states since Wolf to develop alternative methods
for deterring unreasonable searches and seizures was "not basically relevant"
to its decision.
39
The Stone Court considered the personal constitutional right of the de-
fendant to be the sole alternative to deterrence as a justification for exclu-
sion.40 It concluded, however, that the personal right rationale was no longer
tenable in light of post-Mapp decisions, such as Linkletter v. Walker,41 and
United States v. Calandra.42  Linkletter had refused to give full retroactive
effect to Mapp, and Calandra had declined to apply the exclusionary rule in
grand jury proceedings. The Stone Court stated that the rationale for these
holdings had been that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would
not be served by its application in these circumstances. 43 The Court in Stone
also relied on Walder v. United States,44 a pre-Mapp decision which held that
31. Justice Day explained that exclusion was necessary because "[t]o sanction such proceed-
ings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthor-
ized action." Id. at 394.
32. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
33. This view was expressed by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring
unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal
standard assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.
Id. at 31.
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. For instance, Justice Clark stated in the Court's opinion that "the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 656 (quoting from
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
36. 367 U.S. at 656.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 659.
39. Id. at 651.
40. 428 U.S. at 486-88.
41. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
42. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
43. 428 U.S. at 486-87.
44. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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Weeks did not prohibit the use of unlawfully seized evidence to impeach a
defendant's testimony in a federal prosecution.
These cases, however, do not establish the proposition the Court finds in
them: that a conviction based on illegally seized evidence violates no personal
constitutional right of the defendant. Calandra and Walder rejected special
applications of the exclusionary rule, without impairing the principle that a
conviction based on illegally seized evidence is constitutionally invalid. A
refusal to extend a principle, as in Calandra and Walder, does not constitute a
rejection of it.
Linkletter itself proceeds on a strong assumption of the availability of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners to raise exclusionary rule claims.
First, it holds that prisoners whose convictions were not final on the date
Mapp was announced are entitled to retroactive application of the rule. 45 For
those defendants whose convictions became final after Mapp but before the
decision in Linkletter four years later, the Linkletter retroactivity ruling would
be primarily theoretical absent the availability of federal habeas corpus relief,
since there would be virtually no postconviction proceeding for implementing
it.46 Plainly, the Court did not intend its mandate of relief to be theoretical.
Second, Linkletter held that the Mapp rule did not apply to persons whose
convictions had become final before the Mapp decision. This controversial
ruling would have been an insignificant trifle unless there was a mechanism
available for postconviction relief.47  Federal habeas corpus is the classic
mechanism for such relief, as the Linkletter Court was aware. In sum, Linklet-
ter is primarily a ruling about which state defendants may obtain relief under
the exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus.
48
The Stone Court further contended that its balancing approach found
"expression" 49 in the rule and reasoning of Alderman v. United States.50
Alderman held that defendants other than victims of an illegal search or
seizure may not invoke the exclusionary rule because any deterrent benefit is
outweighed by the resulting impairment to the truth-seeking process. 51 Alder-
45. 381 U.S. at 638-40.
46. In 1965, when Linkletter was decided, state post-conviction procedures for the adjudica-
tion of federal constitutional claims were the exception rather than the rule. See Case v. Ne-
braska, 381 U.S. 336, 338-40 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 34546 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Moreover, assuming that Mapp claims were not reviewable under the federal habeas corpus
statutes, courts in those states with post-conviction procedures coextensive with federal habeas
corpus could also justifiably deny relief for Mapp claims.
47. Since four years had passed between Mapp and Linkletter, the number of pre-Mapp
convictions still directly reviewable in the Supreme Court was probably small. Accordingly, the
retroactivity problem would have been insubstantial unless the Linkletter Court assumed the
availability of federal habeas corpus to consider Mapp claims. See Bender, The Retroactive Effect
of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650, 655-60 (1962).
48. See Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 78 n.73 (1965) ("[I]f the Court
in Linkletter contemplated that federal habeas corpus would never lie to enforce claims of the
Mapp type, a holding in those terms would have been a relatively simple way to dispose of the
problem before it.").
49. 428 U.S. at 488.
50. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
51. 428 U.S. at 488-89.
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man's balancing, however, does not support the balancing done in Stone.
Indeed, Alderman's language suggests that a person's status as a victim of a
fourth amendment violation is a sufficient basis for exclusion without regard
to deterrent effect; balancing was held appropriate in Alderman solely because
the defendant had not been the object of unconstitutional police action.
52
Stone's legal predicate, that deterrence alone justifies exclusion, is not
necessarily untenable despite (a) the Court's previous recognition that habeas
corpus was available to raise Mapp exclusionary rule claims, and (b) the fact
that post-Mapp decisions do not repudiate a link between exclusion and a
defendant's constitutional right. In order to criticize Stone persuasively on
this point, an affirmative case for the linkage must be established. Arguments
that the exclusionary rule rests on a personal constitutional right fall into two
legal categories: (1) those which analogize53 or couple 4 the fourth and fifth
52. The Alderman Court stated:
We adhere ... to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal
rights which, like some other constitutional rights may not be vicariously asserted ....
[W]e think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between prevent-
ing the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally seized from him
and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for
exclusion.
The necessity for that predicate was not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledg-
ing the deterrent aim of the rule .... The deterrent values of preventing the incrimina-
tion of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to
justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that
the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would
justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of
crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.
394 U.S. at 174-75. Concededly, this passage is ambiguous in its explanation of the different
treatment accorded victims and nonvictims. On the one hand, Alderman suggests that exclusion is
a personal constitutional right. That is, fourth amendment rights are "personal" and "may not
be vicariously asserted." Id. at 174. Moreover, there is a "substantial difference for constitu-
tional purposes" between victims and nonvictims of unconstitutional searches or seizures with
regard to the exclusion of evidence. Id. On the other hand, Alderman also generally justifies
exclusion on the instrumental grounds of "deterrent values." Id. The Court's decision, a year
earlier, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), tends to support the former interpreta-
tion. Holding that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing may not be used in the
prosecution's direct case at trial, Simmons deemed it "intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Id. at 394.
53. Justice Clark analogized the exclusion of illegally seized evidence with the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against the evidentiary use of coerced testimony in the following obscure
passage in Mapp:
[A]s to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the
States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from
convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an "intimate relation" in their
perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil liberty [secured] . . . only after years
of struggle," Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1897). They express "supple-
menting phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas of
personal privacy." Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944). The philoso-
phy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not
dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least that together
they assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence. Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). See also notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 82:1
HABEAS CORPUS
amendments; and (2) those which rely solely on the fourth amendment. 55
None of these attempts to affirmatively establish a personal constitutional
right to exclusion is ultimately successful.
Efforts to justify the exclusionary rule by either analogizing or joining
together the fourth and fifth amendments are traceable to Justice Bradley's
opinion in Boyd v. United States56 in 1886. He perceived an "intimate rela-
tion" 57 between these amendments, which was based on several observations.
First, searches for private papers are always "unreasonable" 5 8 under the
fourth amendment, no matter how compelling the showing of probable cause
for issuance of a warrant. 59 Second, such searches are also condemned by the
fifth amendment. 60 Finally, the fourth and fifth amendments have a com-
mon purpose of protecting personal privacy.6 '
Whatever the historical validity of these observations,6 2 and whether or
not Boyd's union of the fourth and fifth amendments provided a basis for the
54. Id. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black perceived the interlocking of the
fourth and fifth amendments as the only tenable ground on which to bar the admission of
unconstitutionally seized evidence. "[W]hen the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against self-incrimi-
nation, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusion-
ary rule." Id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring).
55. Justice Clark in Mapp states that the exclusionary rule is an "essential part" of the
fourth amendment, id. at 656, and seems to derive the rule without any aid from the fifth.
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
57. Id. at 633.
58. Id.
59. Justice Bradley distinguished searches for stolen goods, contraband, or forfeited mate-
rial, which the government has some right to possess, from searches for items where the individ-
ual's property interest is superior to that of the government. The former searches are allowed so
long as the procedural safeguards of the fourth amendment are satisfied; the latter searches are
always forbidden.
The searches for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for
and seizure of a man's private books and papers .... The two things differ toto coelo.
In one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is
not.
Id. at 623.
60. See, e.g., the following remarks by Justice Bradley: "And we have been unable to
perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633.
61. Following a lengthy review of the historical underpinnings of the fourth and fifth
amendments, Justice Bradley concluded that their principles
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ~s of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the .breaking of his doors, and the
'ummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property .... In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other.
Id. at 630.
62. Compare Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 664, 692-98 (1961), with Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
945, 951-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Formalism].
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exclusionary rule,6 3 subsequent Supreme Court decisions have dissolved the
marriage. 64 For example, Warden v. Hayden,65 which overruled the mere
evidence doctrine, rejected the notion that paper searches are unreasonable
per se. Andresen v. Maryland6 held that the fifth amendment does not
protect against a search and seizure of private papers containing incriminating
statements made by the accused, and Fisher v. United States 7 repudiated the
idea of a fifth amendment privacy interest. Consequently, a personal constitu-
tional right to the exclusionary rule cannot presently be based on a unitary
reading of the fourth and fifth amendments.
The genesis in Supreme Court jurisprudence of a personal constitutional
right to the exclusionary rule premised solely on the fourth amendment is
63. Boyd held unconstitutional the compulsory production of a person's private papers as
required by a federal statute for use in civil forfeiture proceedings. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The
Court's opinion emphasized the close interrelationship between the fourth and fifth amendments,
and many commentators have interpreted Boyd as resting on a conjunction of the amendments.
See Formalism, supra note 61, at 955 n.61. Boyd's holding, however, may equally suggest that the
procedure at issue violated each of the amendments separately. Justice Bradley's fourth amend-
ment analysis proceeded in two steps. First, despite the absence of physical intrusion by govern.
ment agents, a "search and seizure," within the meaning of the fourth amendment, occurred
because compelled production "effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure." 116
U.S. at 622. Second, he concluded that the search was "unreasonable" because paper searches are
forbidden. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text supra. The fifth amendment analysis rested
on the proposition that compulsion to produce incriminating documents requires witnessing
against oneself. See 116 U.S. at 629-32; note 60 supra.
Boyd did not establish the principle that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible at trial. According to Boyd's fourth amendment analysis, the illegal
search occurred contemporaneously with the production of the documents in court and their
introduction into evidence. Consequently, Boyd imposed a prohibition on the search itself, rather
than upon subsequent evidentiary use of the ill-gotten fruits. Nor did the Court adopt the
exclusionary rule by virtue of Boyd's fifth amendment analysis that compelled production is
equivalent to a search. The Court subsequently held in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904),
that a seizure of papers is not tantamount to their compelled production. When the federal
exclusionary rule was adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), reliance was placed
neither upon Boyd nor upon the mutuality between the fourth and fifth amendments.
The Court first tied the Weeks exclusionary rule to Boyd and the fifth amendment in Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), which prohibited the admission of private papers illegally
seized from the defendant's office. "IT]he result is the same to one accused of crime, whether he
be obliged to supply evidence against himself or whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal
search of his premises and seizure of his private papers." Id. at 306. It was immediately clear that
the application of Boyd and the self-incrimination rationale were not dependent on the testimo-
nial quality of the evidence. On the same day, the Court decided Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921), and used identical logic to overturn a conviction based on the admission into evidence
of unconstitutionally seized whiskey. Four years later, the Court described the fifth amendment
basis for the Weeks exclusionary rule as "well settled." Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33
(1925).
64. For an interesting historical analysis suggesting that the marriage of the fourth and fifth
amendments was shaky almost immediately following its inception and gradually disintegrated,
see Formalism, supra note 62.
65. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
66. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
67. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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uncertain.68  The Mapp opinion did not indicate why the exclusionary rule is
an "essential part ' 69 of the fourth amendment, except for saying that
without [the exclusionary] rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its con-
ceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty.' "70
This was an apparent reference to the Court's prior decision in Rochin v.
California,71 which excluded evidence gathered by forcible stomach-pumping.
Rochin held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbade
"convictions ... brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of jus-
tice.' "172 It can be argued that this passage implies that evidence must be
excluded whenever the fourth amendment is violated, since such conduct
offends our sense of justice. This argument, however, begs the question
whether a defendant possesses a personal constitutional right to exclusion by
assuming that preservation of the defendant's personal constitutional right
was the reason for exclusion in Rochin. To the contrary, the decision is more
reasonably read to reflect judicial condemnation of gross official miscon-
duct.7
3
Two obstacles, both rooted in the language of the fourth amendment,
must be surmounted if an exclusion right is to be anchored in the fourth
amendment. In sharp contrast to the specific evidentiary limitation imposed
by the fifth amendment, the fourth is silent regarding an evidentiary privilege.
Moreover, the fourth amendment speaks of protecting the "people" from
unreasonable searches and seizures, rather than protecting the trial rights of
68. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1975). The rationale of Justice Frankfurter in Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959), since repudiated, possibly contains the foundation of a personal constitu-
tional rights theory of exclusion based on the fourth amendment alone. Frank held that the
fourteenth amendment does not require a municipal housing inspector to possess a search warrant
in order to search private premises for health hazards. Id. at 373. According to Justice Frank-
furter, the fourth amendment protects two separate interests: (I) the right of the individual to be
secure from unauthorized official invasions of personal privacy; and (2) the right of the individual
to resist invasions designed to secure evidence which will be used against him in a criminal
proceeding. Id. at 365. This second interest, described as a right of "self-protection," id., was
deemed the more fundamental, and the warrant requirement was limited to searches threatening
that interest.
Although advanced to limit the warrant requirement, the self-protection theory also lends
support to the proposition that a victim of an unreasonable search for evidences of crime
possesses a personal constitutional right to exclusion. That is, the admission of illegally seized
evidence implicates his fourth amendment interest of self-protection. The self-protection theory,
however, was rejected. Frank was overruled in Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
where the Court accorded criminal suspects greater fourth amendment protection than law-abid-
ing citizens. Id. at 539-40.
69. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
70. 367 U.S. at 655.
71. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
72. Id. at 173.
73. Admission of the evidence would be "to sanction the brutal conduct... [and] would be
to afford brutality the cloak of law." 342 U.S. at 173.
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an accused. Despite persistent efforts,7 4 these obstacles have not been over-
come, and the affirmative case for a personal constitutional right to exclusion
remains unmade. Thus, Stone, presumably correctly, advances the premise
that the sole justification for the exclusionary rule is deterrence. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to examine the Court's cost-benefit analysis as a basis for
understanding the reasoning and logic of Stone.
C. The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Stone's cost-benefit analysis separates the advantages and disadvantages
of the exclusionary rule into two categories: those incident to the rule's
application at trial and on appeal, and those incident to its application on
federal collateral review. 75  The benefit anticipated from the exclusionary
rule's application at any stage of the criminal process is general deterrence of
police misconduct. 76  Exclusion removes one incentive police may have to
ignore the commands of the fourth amendment, and also underscores soci-
ety's high regard for the fourth amendment guarantee. 77  While conceding
that some deterrent benefit may accompany application of the exclusionary
rule at trial and on appeal, the Stone Court maintains that its application in
federal collateral proceedings is less likely to produce an incremental increase
in deterrence. 7a Stone found it unreasonable to assume "that law enforce-
ment authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a
search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal."17 0
Federal habeas review is traditionally perceived as a necessary surrogate
for direct review in the Supreme Court, because direct review is felt inade-
quate to protect the constitutional rights of state criminal defendants. 0 From
this standpoint, the advisability of federal collateral review in Stone depends
less upon deterrence of police misconduct than upon the need for federal trial
court oversight to ensure that state judges respond appropriately to fourth
amendment claims raised by criminal defendants. 8' Stone, however, emphat-
74. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 29.
75. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976).
76. Id. at 492.
77. Id. The exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence entails two aspects of general deter-
rence-direct and indirect deterrence. Direct deterrence depends on the threat of exclusion to
ensure police compliance with search and seizure rules. Indirect deterrence, which operates
independently of the fear of sanctions, is more long range, and depends on the socializing
influence of the exclusionary rule and its imposition on law enforcement officers. See Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-12 (1970).
78. 428 U.S. at 493.
79. Id.
80. The great numbers of petitions for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court by state
prisoners, many of whom fail to file the papers necessary to inform the Court of the state
proceedings, render Supreme Court review inadequate to vindicate federal constitutional rights of
persons convicted in state court. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 493-94 (1953) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-conviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108
U. Pa. L. Rev. 461, 464 (1960).
81. Advocates of expansive federal habeas corpus jurisdiction advance institutional argu-
ments to explain why federal judges are more likely to be responsive to federal constitutional
claims of a state defendant than state judges. See Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus For
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ically rejects this oversight justification, proclaiming that state judges are as
able as federal judges to decide fourth amendment claims and no less sympa-
thetic to them.82  No empirical support is presented for this proposition.
Indeed, the companion case to Stone, Wolff v. Rice,83 tends to demonstrate
the opposite, for there the state court's rejection of the fourth amendment
claim was contrary to established fourth amefidment principles.
4
On the debit side of the ledger, the Stone court notes that the exclusion-
ary rule, whenever applied, diverts attention from the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, deprives the factfinder of reliable and typically probative information,
and offers a windfall to the guilty. 85 Moreover, significant costs generally
accompany its ultilization in federal collateral proceedings: the consumption
of scarce federal judicial resources, delayed finality of criminal proceedings,
and friction between federal and state judiciaries.8 6 No countervailing bene-
fits are found in Stone to offset these incremental costs.
The chief problem with the Court's balancing analysis is that it rests
largely on untested and unproven factual assumptions. There are no data on
the pivotal issue: is federal collateral review necessary to ensure adequate state
court enforcement of the exclusionary rule? Additionally, the evidence upon
which the Court finds collateral application of the exclusionary rule to entail
substantial incremental cost is weak. For example, the contention that an
unacceptable burden on the federal judiciary accompanies habeas corpus
review of search and seizure claims is supported by Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,87 in which he observed the in-
creasing number of habeas corpus petitions filed annually by state pris-
oners.88  This statistic, however, does not reveal the number of fourth
amendment claims raised in collateral proceedings, or the amount of federal
judicial time devoted to resolving them. Similarly, the Stone Court repeats the
homily that federal collateral review of state prisoners' claims tends to under-
State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L.J. 895, 898 n.14 (1966)
(quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 510 (1963)).
82. 428 U.S. at 493 n.35.
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to fed-
eral constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in
the trial and appellate courts of the several States.
Id. at 494 n.35.
83. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
84. The issue in Wolff was whether the p&lice presented sufficient facts to establish probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The state court determined that the warrant was
supported by probable cause, and considered evidence which was adduced at the suppression
hearing but not presented to the magistrate who issued the warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728,
199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). This was in clear contravention of the standard announced in Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.3 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964).
See Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976).
85. 428 U.S. at 490.
86. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
87. 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
88. 412 U.S. 260 n.14.
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mine the federal system by generating friction between the state and federal
judiciaries,89 and calls to mind the specter of a single district judge overruling
the highest appellate state court on a question of federal constitutional law."
Again, the Court offers no factual support for the proposition that this
theoretical possibility actually occurs. Rather, it is likely that many habeas
corpus petitioners present fourth amendment claims that have neither been
accepted for consideration by the state's highest court nor been given written
consideration by any other state tribunal.
The Stone Court can be justly criticized for presenting an insufficient
factual base to support its assessment of the costs and benefits of fourth
amendment habeas litigation in federal court. On the other hand, similar
criticism can be addressed to the proponents of such review. No convincing
empirical data are available to support either side of the argument, and the
prospect for any to be forthcoming is dim.9' Nevertheless, if reliable data
were available, and if agreement could be reached as to the identity and
measurement of the relevant costs and benefits, the controversy over the
desirability of federal collateral review of fourth amendment claims would not
end. Rather, the argument would shift to the weight that should attach to each
of the various conflicting interests. 92
D. The Exception
The Stone Court did not completely bar federal habeas litigation of
fourth amendment claims, but rather, created an exception where "an oppor-
tunity for full and fair litigation" has been denied.93  No explanation for the
exception was given, nor was any direct guidance for its interpretation pro-
vided except for a cryptic reference to Townsend v. Sain.94
The reference to Townsend has provoked considerable lower court dis-
cussion. The dominant view is that Townsend provides only limited assistance
89. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
90. See the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 263-65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), where he recalls the remarks of Justice Paul C.
Reardon of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court regarding the denigration of state courts
and " 'humiliation of review from the full bench of the highest State appellate court to a single
United States District Court Judge' " occasioned by federal habeas corpus review.
91. See Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321,
324-25 (1973).
92. For example, what incremental increase in federal-state friction would be warranted to
attain an additional unit of deterrence? The Stone majority opinion does not address these types
of issues. In this respect, Stone's balancing analysis resembles an "engineer's black box-the
Court throws the interests in at one end, and a result emerges from the other." Tushnet, Judicial
Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L.
Rev. 484, 501 (1975).
93. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
94. The Court makes a "cf." reference to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), after one
of the several places in the majority opinion where reference is made to the opportunity for full
and fair litigation. 428 U.S. at 494 n.36. According to A Uniform System of Citation 7 (12th ed.
1976), the "cf." signal indicates that the cited authority "supports a proposition different from"
but "sufficiently analogous" to lend some support to the text. The Stone opinion, however, does
not elaborate on their similarity.
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in defining the content of the Stone exception. 95 This view is probably an
exaggeration of Townsend's usefulness. Townsend set forth standards govern-
ing the granting of an evidentiary hearing by a federal court in a habeas
corpus proceeding. These standards include:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by
the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4)
there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state court
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact
did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
96
These criteria are of little help in defining the content of the Court's
phrase "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" for the purpose of deter-
mining the availability vel non of federal habeas review of fourth amendment
claims. The Townsend standards assume that a state evidentiary hearing was
held.9 7  Consequently, they are irrelevant to the issue of whether the peti-
tioner received a sufficient opportunity to obtain a hearing when none was
held. 98 In addition, even if a state evidentiary hearing was held, the criteria
focus on the resolution of factual disputes, and are not pertinent when either
the issues raised on habeas corpus are solely legal questions, 9 involve mixed
questions of law and fact, 100 or relate to the adequacy of the state appellate
process. 01
More fundamentally, the premises of Townsend and Stone are at
odds. 10 2  Townsend focuses on the potential for error in state court fact-
finding to justify a de novo hearing in federal court, 0 3 while Stone under-
scores the ability and integrity of state judges to justify curtailment of federal
habeas review. 10 4 Further, although the inquiries pursued under Townsend
and Stone are similarly formulated, i.e., whether a habeas petitioner was
afforded a full and fair hearing, the consequences of these determinations are
95. See, e.g., Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (4th Cir. 1978); Gates v. Hender-
son, 568 F.2d 830, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); O'Berry v.
Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1210-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). But see Gibson
v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1045, 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rubin, J., addendum), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1119 (1979); Curry v. Garrison, 423 F. Supp. 109, 110 (W.D.N.C. 1976), appeal dismissed, 565
F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1977).
96. 372 U.S. at 313.
97. 372 U.S. at 312-13.
98. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing en bane), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
99. See, e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
101. See, e.g., Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 272
(1980).
103. 372 U.S. at 314-16.
104. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
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radically different. Under Townsend, if the district court determines that the
state hearing was full and fair, the only effect is that it must accept the state
court findings of fact in its independent review of legal rulings. 05 On the
other hand, a determination under Stone that state court consideration of the
fourth amendment claim was full and fair effectively results in denial of all
review,106 and is tantamount to a lack of jurisdiction over the matter. 0 7 Since
Stone, in essence, establishes a jurisdictional limit on habeas corpus review,
presumably something more is necessary to overcome this barrier than is
required to justify a federal evidentiary hearing where the power to undertake
federal review is beyond doubt. In light of these significant differences, the
reference to Townsend provides little guidance for elucidating the content of
the exception.
It has been suggested that the exception is an outgrowth of the view
expressed by Professor Bator, 08 that the proper role of federal habeas corpus
review of state prisoners' constitutional claims is "not to assure that federal
questions are correctly decided, but to assure that they are decided by proce-
dures calculated to reach a correct decision." 0 9 To be sure, Professor Ba-
tor's ideas have exercised considerable influence on the shaping of Justice
Powell's individual views concerning federal habeas corpus." 0 They are
inadequate, however, to rationalize Stone's limitation on fourth amendment
litigation or its exception. Bator's thesis is based largely on the history of
habeas corpus practice in America prior to the decision of Brown v. Allen"'
in 1953, which applied habeas review to constitutional claims generally, and
upon policy considerations which emphasize the importance of finality in
criminal cases."12  Bator posits that under the federal habeas corpus statute,
review of state prisoners' constitutional claims is justified in only two in-
stances-where either the state committing court lacked jurisdiction in the
narrow sense of judicial competence, or the state judicial system did not
afford a fair and rational process for meaningful consideration of their
claims." 3 Stone, on the other hand, rests on a constitutional judgment about
the source of the exclusionary rule, i.e., that exclusion is not a personal
constitutional right, and on a utilitarian judgment concerning the rule's appli-
cation in various fora. Stone does not posit an interpretation of the habeas
105. 372 U.S. at 312-13, 318.
106. 428 U.S. at 494-95.
107. As Chief Judge Brown concluded in O'Berry, "[djespite the assertions of the Supreme
Court in Stone to the contrary, we would be blind to reality to pretend that the practical effect of
that decision is not a limitation on federal court jurisdiction." O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d
1204, 1211-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
108. Bator, Finality In Criminal Law And Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
109. Seidman, supra note 4, at 458.
110. In his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973),
Justice Powell repeatedly relied on Professor Bator's article. See, e.g., id. at 253 nn.3 & 5, 255
n.7, 259 n.13.
111. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
112. Bator, supra note 108, at 444-53, 463-99.
113. See generally Bator, supra note 108, at 523-28.
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corpus statute. Moreover, the limitation urged by Bator would apply to
constitutional claims generally, and not solely to fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule claims. To date, however, a majority of the Court has declined to
extend Stone's reach beyond fourth amendment claims.1 4 Thus, the excep-
tion cannot be derived merely from an interpretation of the habeas corpus
statute." 5
II. THE "OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FAIR LITIGATION"
STANDARD IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Courts' Interpretations of the Standard
The term "opportunity," as used in the requirement of an "opportunity
for full and fair litigation," contemplates both the opportunity to raise a
fourth amendment claim in the state courts and the opportunity to have the
claim adjudicated." 6 A fourth amendment claim presented by a state pris-
oner to a federal habeas court may or may not have been decided on the
merits by the state courts. If it was considered and rejected on the merits, the
federal issue is whether the opportunity for adjudication was full and fair.
Alternatively, if there was no decision on the merits, the issue is whether the
opportunity for raising the claim was full and fair.
1. Application of the Standard When the Claim Was Rejected on its
Merits by the State Courts. The lower federal courts generally agree that an
erroneous fourth amendment decision by the state courts, without more, does
not constitute denial of an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." "7 It is
of no consequence whether the state courts employed an incorrect legal stand-
ard," 8 misapplied the correct standard," 9 or erred in finding the underlying
114. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), which refused to extend Stone to bar
habeas review of a state prisoner's grand jury discrimination claim.
115. The Stone exception may also be explained on the theory that denial of an opportunity
for full and fair hearing constitutes an independent denial of due process, i.e., what Justice
Brandeis referred to as "due process in the primary sense,-whether [a litigant] has had an
opportunity to present its case and be heard in its support." Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 (1930). It is unlikely, however, that the Stone Court intended to
base the exception on due process, given its underlying premises that the admission of illegally
seized evidence implicates neither a personal constitutional right of the accused nor the basic
fairness of the trial.
116. Justice Powell formulated the standard more precisely in his concurring opinion in
Schneckloth, where he maintained that federal collateral review of a state prisoner's fourth
amendment claim should be confined solely to the question of "whether the petitioner was
provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts." Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Under Stone a federal
district court may not relitigate a fourth amendment issue tried fully and fairly in a state court,
regardless of its view of the correctness of the state decision."). Cf. generally United States ex rel.
Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Dupont v. Hall,
555 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903, 906 (3d
Cir. 1977).
118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 616 (D. Conn.
1978).
119. See, e.g., Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978); Holmberg v.
Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).
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facts.120  If Stone's restrictions could be avoided simply by alleging that the
state courts erred in deciding a fourth amendment claim, many lower courts
fear that Stone's bar would become a nullity, since petitioners would routinely
allege the necessary error.' 2' Further, this interpretation is considered con-
sistent with Stone's observation that state judges are as receptive and compe-
tent to decide search and seizure claims as federal judges, 22 and with the
Court's concern for comity and finality in state criminal proceedings. 2 Fi-
nally, as previously noted, in Wolff, the companion case decided with Stone,
"[T]he petitioner's Fourth Amendment right was clearly violated by an illegal
search ... but the Supreme Court did not review that claim since it held that
the petitioner had a full and fair hearing in the state court.'
' 2 4
Not all federal courts, however, accept the view that habeas corpus
review is unavailable solely because the state decision was erroneous. For
instance, a Tenth Circuit panel concluded that a habeas court should address
the merits of a fourth amendment claim whenever the "state court wilfully
refuses to apply the correct and controlling constitutional standards.'
2
.
Stone's requirement of "opportunity for full and fair litigation" was per-
ceived as encompassing "colorable application of the correct Fourth Amend-
ment constitutional standards.' 26  This decision, however, is without prog-
eny. 2
7
Most lower federal courts interpret Stone's use of the term "opportu-
nity" to mean that habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim may be
available only where state process was defective. 28 Thus, the initial consider-
120. See, e.g., Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Petillo
v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903, 907 (3rd Cir. 1977).
121. See, e.g., Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex
rel. Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 616 (D. Conn. 1978). For instance, the Carbone court
denied the petitions for habeas corpus and dismissed the claim that the state court employed an
incorrect legal standard.
If this Court were to rule that Stone does not preclude habeas corpus review because the
Connecticut Supreme Court did not apply an appropriate standard of review in deciding
the Fourth Amendment claim, it would be the rare state prisoner indeed who would not
allege that the state court had applied an improper standard when the state court ruled
adversely to him in deciding his Fourth Amendment claim.
Id. at 616.
122. See, e.g., Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
123. See, e.g., Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1977).
124. Holmberg v. -Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 n.l (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977); see note 84 and accompanying text supra.
125. Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978).
126. Id. Observing that the Stone opinion interchanges the phrases "full and fair litigation"
and "full and fair consideration," the Gamble court reasoned that "in some instances more than
procedural opportunity to raise and litigate a Fourth Amendment claim is required. Indeed,
consideration connotes the actual evaluation of a claim under the correct constitutional stand-
ard." Id. at 1165 n.2.
127. Infrequently cited, Gamble has never been employed as authority for reaching the
merits of a fourth amendment claim on habeas corpus. Indeed, it has been narrowly read by one
court to apply only when there is flagrant disregard of Supreme Court precedent. United States ex
rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979).
128. See, e.g., Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1978); Hines v. Auger,
550 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard, 426 F. Supp.
97, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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ation of a fourth amendment claim by a habeas court is limited to whether the
process of adjudication was satisfactory. Unless the petitioner alleges that
some procedural defect impaired litigation of his fourth amendment claim,
courts read Stone to require dismissal. 12 9  Given the dichotomy between
process and substance, the classification of an alleged error as procedural or
substantive is critical to the availability of habeas review.
The significance of this procedural-substantive distinction may be seen in
United States ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard,130 in which the habeas petitioner
claimed that unconstitutional wiretapping was the source of prosecutorial
evidence used against him at trial. The police in Conroy had obtained a court
order authorizing a wiretap on petitioner's telephone and, when the order
expired, continued to eavesdrop for several days before obtaining a second
order. The state courts ruled that only the first wiretap order was legal, but
concluded that the prosecution's evidence had been obtained independently of
any wiretapping.13 1 Petitioner challenged the state court rulings in his peti-
tion for habeas corpus. Treating the challenge to the first wiretap order as
substantive, the district court summarily rejected it: "[Petitioner] asserts that
the hearing was unfair because the court interpreted the facts differently than
[he] would have preferred, and issued a ruling contrary to [his] posture ....
It is precisely this manner of claim which the district courts, under Stone v.
Powell, are precluded from hearing .... ,,
32
The Conroy court, however, inquired more deeply into the independent
source claim, because petitioner alleged a procedural defect in the state pro-
ceedings. Petitioner had urged that the prosecution was precluded from prov-
ing an independent source for its evidence, because state officers had de-
stroyed some of the wiretap tapes in bad faith, which effectively prevented
petitioner from pursuing the taint question.13 3  After examining the record,
the district court rejected the claim that process was inadequate: 34 "Peti-
tioner's allegations that the tapes were unavailable because of bad faith are
really complaints about the hearing result, not the procedure. He had the
opportunity to argue his point at the state hearing; after examining the facts,
the hearing court disagreed." 1
35
129. See, e.g., Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 1978).
130. 426 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
131. Id. at 100-01.
132. Id. at 102.
133. Id. at 101, 103.
134. Id. at 107-08. Petitioner contended that the state hearing was procedurally defective
because restrictions on defense cross-examination prevented him from demonstrating bad faith
destruction of the tapes. The Conroy court, after examining the record, concluded that the
curtailment of cross-examination was proper. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitioner's
claim that the independent source issue should be relitigated.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the available state procedures were inadequate
or otherwise prevented him from presenting his claims, nor has -he shown that the
conduct of the hearing judge circumvented those procedures. Instead, he maintains that
the hearing court's conclusions were incorrect, and he urges that rulings more favorable
to his position be imposed on the state court by a federal court .... Stone ... militates
against such action by a district court.
Id. at 109.
135. Id. at 108.
1982]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
It is possible to conceive of a consequential procedural error, however.
For example, a habeas court may find that the state trial judge erroneously
required a defendant to carry the burden of proof on the issue of probable
cause. The federal issue then is whether this procedural defect constituted a
denial of an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." Habeas courts typically
resolve this issue by examining the totality of the state court proceedings and
determining if the state appellate process was adequate to correct trial er-
ror. 38  Consequently, if a trial court erroneously requires a defendant to
prove the absence of probable cause, but the error is subsequently corrected
on appeal without change in the result, then habeas corpus review may be
denied.1
37
In the end, wherever state courts reject fourth amendment claims on their
merits, habeas applicants are generally unsuccessful in obtaining federal re-
view on the basis of alleged state procedural defects at trial or on appeal.1
3 8
Allegations that state trial courts misallocated the burden of proof,39 errone-
ously refused to hold an evidentiary hearing, 4 0 or failed to hear relevant
evidence' 4 ' have not succeeded. One rationale used is that the facts are suffi-
ciently well developed in the record so that errors may be corrected on appeal.
Conversely, the petitioner may be held responsible for the inadequate factual
development in the record on appeal, also resulting in dismissal of the peti-
tion. 42  Contentions regarding the procedural defectiveness of the appellate
disposition of a fourth amendment claim have also failed. 43
136. See, e.g., Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 562
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 878, 883 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 272 (1980); Pignone v. Sands, 589 F.2d 76, 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978) (alternative holding). The
state appellate court in Palmigiano had concluded that the erroneous placement of the burden of
proof was not a factor in the trial court's findings; consequently, the habeas court determined
that the error did not distort the review process. 618 F.2d at 883.
138. But see Doescher v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 272
(1980); Pignone v. Sands, 589 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1978).
140. See, e.g., Lewis v. Gourley, 560 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1977);
Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1977); Simmons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
Lewis held that a second evidentiary hearing was not required on a motion to suppress when
petitioner's first trial ended in a mistrial, and a plenary hearing had occurred prior to his first
trial. 560 F.2d at 394. Similarly, the Mack court agreed with the state trial judge's conclusion that
an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in light of the petitioner's failure to set forth sufficient
facts in his supporting affidavit that specifically contradicted the prosecution's averments. 564
F.2d at 901. Finally, Simmons also held it unnecessary for a state coram nobis judge to hold an
evidentiary hearing, when the same judge presided at the petitioner's pre-trial hearings and trial,
and the petitioner had not alleged the subsequent discovery of new evidence. 552 F.2d at 68-69.
141. See, e.g., Pignone v. Sands, 589 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1978), which held, as an alternative
ground for decision, that the petitioner could not complain about a state trial court's refusal to
consider evidence of exigent circumstances at a hearing on a motion to suppress when petitioner
had elected to proceed on stipulated facts during an earlier proceeding.
142. See, e.g., Pignone v. Sands, 589 F.2d 76 (Ist Cir. 1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
143. See, e.g., Tackno v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978); Hines v. Auger, 550
F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1977). Examples of alleged procedural defects include summary
rejection, or dismissal without specific mention, of fourth amendment claims by appellate courts.
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2. Application of the Standard when the Claim Was Not Decided on its
Merits by the State Courts. Focusing on the use of the word "opportunity" in
the exception, the lower federal courts generally conclude that actual litigation
on the merits in the state courts is not necessary to invoke Stone's ban on
collateral review. 144 Rather, the issue is whether the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to litigate as envisioned by Stone, regardless of whether he availed
himself of it.
145
In cases where the fourth amendment claim was not raised in the state
courts, or where the state courts refused to reach the merits because of a
procedural default attributed to the defendant, several standards have been
suggested to determine the availability of federal collateral review: "deliberate
bypass,"'146 "cause and prejudice,"'147 adequate state corrective process, 148
and independent and adequate state ground.
49
Under the "deliberate bypass" standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Fay v. Noia,150 a petition for habeas corpus review is not precluded
when the defendant fails to raise, or improperly raises a constitutional claim in
the state courts, unless state procedures was intentionally waived. 151 Although
neither Fay nor the "deliberate bypass" standard were mentioned in the Stone
majority opinion, Fay appears to have been effectively overruled with respect
to fourth amendment claims. 52  The intentional-waiver test rests on the
144. The Fifth Circuit decision of Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1978), offered
this explanation.
An "opportunity for full and fair litigation" means just that: an opportunity. If a state
provides the processes whereby a defendant can obtain full and fair litigation of a fourth
amendment claim, Stone v. Powell bars federal habeas corpus consideration of that
claim whether or not the defendant employs those processes.
Id. at 1192. Cf. generally United States ex rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 925 (1979); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
145. See, e.g., Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 1978); note 144 supra.
146. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1222-23 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
147. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 842-44 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring)
(rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
148. See cases cited in note 144 supra.
149. See Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204, 1216-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
150. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
151. Justice Brennan narrowly defined the circumstances in which habeas corpus review was
precluded as a consequence of the petitioner's failure to raise a federal claim in state court.
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, under-
standingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the
federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his
federal claim on the merits-though of course only after the federal court has satisfied
itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the
applicant's default.
Id. at 439.
152. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
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principle that a convicted defendant should not lose his "last opportunity to
vindicate his constitutional rights" because of a state procedural default. 153
This rationale, however, will not support federal collateral review of fourth
amendment exclusionary rule claims in light of Stone's teachings that exclu-
sion is not a personal constitutional right of the accused. Moreover, deter-
rence presumably would not be enhanced by the "deliberate bypass" stand-
ard. That is, it is unreasonable to assume police will consider the two-fold
possibility that (1) an unconstitutional search aAd seizure will go undetected or
unremedied in the state courts because of a defendant's unintentional proce-
dural default, and (2) such unconstitutional conduct will be subjected to
federal collateral review under the intentional-waiver standard and will be
uncovered.
Those who urge the adoption of the "cause and prejudice" standard
contend that it ought generally to govern habeas review of alleged trial-type
errors that do not impair the integrity of state factfinding, when the state
courts did not decide the claim on the merits because of a procedural de-
fault.' -  The cause and prejudice standard was utilized by the Supreme Court
in Francis v. Henderson, 55 which concerned a state prisoner's failure to raise
a timely challenge to the racial composition of the grand jury, and the
consequent denial of state court adjudication. Francis held that subsequent
federal collateral review was barred, unless the petitioner could show "cause"
for his failure to make a timely motion and "actual prejudice" from the
alleged racial imbalance. 56  The Court similarly applied the "cause and
prejudice" standard in Wainwright v. Sykes,157 and denied collateral consider-
ation of a Miranda claim that the state courts had declined to consider,
because the petitioner failed to comply with the state's contemporaneous-
objection rule.
1 8
The majority of courts, however, interpret Stone's exception even more
restrictively and preclude federal review if the state provided "corrective
process" for litigation of a fourth amendment claim.' 59 Under this restrictive
interpretation, habeas relief is available only if a petitioner was "precluded
from utilizing [such corrective process] by reason of an unconscionable break-
153. Fay, 372 U.S. at 432.
154. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 842-44 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
155. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
156. Id. at 425. See also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), which first enunciated
the "cause and prejudice" standard. The federal prisoner in Davis brought an action for collat-
eral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and challenged, for the first time, the makeup of the grand jury
which had indicted him. Id. at 234-36.
157. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
158. Id. at 74, 86.
159. See note 144 supra. The "corrective process" formulation stems in part from a law
review article by Professor Paul M. Bator, supra note 108, in which he urged a more limited scope
of federal habeas corpus jurisidiction confined to the issue of whether the state judicial system
provided the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims in an




down in that process."' 16 0 A somewhat similar interpretation of the exception
forecloses habeas relief when state courts refuse to reach the merits of a fourth
amendment claim on the basis of an independent and adequate state proce-
dural ground. 16 ' The independent-and-adequate-state-ground test, like the
corrective-process standard, is more restrictive than "cause and prejudice." If
the state procedural rule barring consideration of the merits serves a legitimate
state interest and does not discriminate against federal claims, habeas litiga-
tion is foreclosed. Neither the cause of the failure to comply with the proce-
dural rule nor the effect of any resulting prejudice to the defendant is consid-
ered.
112
Application of the corrective-process and the independent-and-adequate-
state-ground standards tend to produce the same results. In theory, however,
the latter standard focuses upon the reasonableness and legitimacy of the
state's forfeiture rule, while the former evaluates the adequacy of the state
system for raising fourth amendment claims. One significant procedural dif-
ference is that the independent-and-adequate-state-ground standard, unlike
the corrective-process standard, requires a state court ruling of procedural
default. Thus, a court that reads the exception narrowly might utilize the
independent-and-adequate-state-ground standard where the state courts
refused to consider a fourth amendment claim, and the corrective-process
standard where the claim is raised for the first time on habeas corpus. 63
In some situations, the absence of a fourth amendment decision on the
merits may be the product of judicial oversight as opposed to a procedural
default attributable to the defendant. For example, suppose a state trial court
refuses to consider a fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim before trial
because it is premature. Later, the same court refuses to consider it after trial
because it could be raised on appeal. Subsequently, the appellate court de-
clines to consider it, based on a belief that the trial court had previously
rejected it on the merits. Presented with essentially these facts, one court
permitted federal collateral litigation on the theory that the petitioner had
160. Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1038 (1978). The "unconscionable breakdown" concept was utilized by the Third Circuit
in Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1980), to require habeas review where the state courts
denied a motion to suppress because it was filed fourteen days late and was not accompanied by a
formal application to enlarge the time for filing. Id. at 248. The public defender had agreed to
represent the defendant with only two days remaining in the 30-day period in which to file
motions to suppress. He omitted to file a formal motion to extend the time for filing in reliance
upon a local practice permitting such motions to be argued on the return date of the motion to
suppress without previous formal application having been made. Unknown to counsel, however,
this practice had been superseded by a new, unwritten policy requiring formal applications. Id. at
248-49. In these circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that "a breakdown in the process
[had] occurred" that had denied the defendant "the opportunity to present his fourth amendment
claim." Id. at 251.
161. See, e.g., Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright,
546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
162. Id.
163. Compare the fifth circuit decisions of O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (independent-and-adequate-state-ground), with Caver v. Ala-
bama, 577 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1978) (corrective-process standard).
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become the victim of a " 'procedural catch-22.' -114 In contrast, another
court, presented with similar facts, refused to consider the claim.85 In this
latter instance, the Fifth Circuit held that Stone precluded federal habeas
review "in the absence of allegations that the processes provided by a state to
fully and fairly litigate fourth amendment claims are routinely or systemati-
cally applied in such a way as to prevent the actual litigation of fourth
amendment claims on their merits." 168 Although a procedural breakdown in
the opportunity for litigation occurred in each case, the first court viewed
"opportunity" from the standpoint of the individual litigant, and the latter
considered "opportunity" from the perspective of the state system of fourth
amendment adjudication.
In summary, the lower federal courts generally agree that federal habeas
corpus review is not available to correct erroneous fourth amendment deci-
sions. When a fourth amendment claim has been rejected on its merits, the
habeas inquiry is initially restricted to the adequacy of the process of adjudi-
cation. Only when that process is determined to be so deficient as to deny an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" will a habeas court undertake the
review of the substantive correctness of the underlying fourth amendment
decision. It is also generally accepted that Stone precludes habeas corpus relief
when state courts do not reach the merits of a fourth amendment claim
because of the defendant's failure to avail himself of state procedures for
litigating the claim. Some courts, in limited circumstances, will excuse this
failure to utilize available state procedures and will permit habeas corpus
review. The majority, however, permit no excuse. Finally, the lower courts
agree that Stone does not bar habeas corpus consideration of fourth amend-
ment claims where the state failed to provide procedures for their litigation, or
where a breakdown in these procedures occurred. Courts are not, however, in
agreement as to the nature of the breakdown that justifies federal collateral
review.
B. A Critique of the Process-Substance Distinction
The lower courts offer no coherent rationale for distinguishing among
fourth amendment habeas claims on the basis of whether the alleged error is
substantive or procedural. The terms themselves are indefinite even where the
reason for drawing the distinction is relatively clear.167  Consequently, absent
164. Cruz v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal dismissed, 622 F.2d
573 (2d Cir. 1980). Cruz held that federal collateral review of federal statutory wiretap claims by
state prisoners are not affected by Stone and, alternatively, that collateral review was permissible
under the Stone exception.
165. Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. Id. at 220.
167. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (substantive-procedural dichotomy for Erie
purposes); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (same). Cf. generally Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Changes, Some Further Last Words on
Erie, the Bead Game, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1974); Ely, Some Further Last Words on Erie, the
Necklace, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1974).
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an informing purpose, judicial categorization of fourth amendment claims as
either substantive or procedural is likely to be extremely uncertain.
The distinction between substance and process is not clear, even in the
paradigmatic case of United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey.68 This case
has been used by lower courts to illustrate the type of defect in state process
which warrants habeas review under the "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion" standard. 6 9 In the face of a definitive United States Supreme Court
precedent to the contrary, the New Jersey Supreme Court announced a rule in
State v. Petillo 170 that precluded challenges to the truthfulness of allegations
in affidavits submitted in support of a search warrant. Subsequently, a state
criminal defendant moved to suppress evidence, claiming wrongful seizure
under the authority of a search warrant procured through police perjury. The
state courts, relying upon the Petillo rule, denied his motion without affording
him a hearing on the veracity of the underlying affidavit, despite a strong
preliminary showing of police perjury.17 ' According to the analysis of some
lower courts' 7 2 habeas corpus review would be appropriate here since the
state failed to provide corrective procedures for litigating the fourth amend-
ment claim.173 The error could be classified as procedural on the view that
the refusal to hear the claim constituted judicial door-closing tantamount to
the failure of the state legislature to enact suppression procedures for such
claims. A substantive classification, however, is equally plausible: the error
could be taken to represent a misconception of the fourth amendment stan-
dard governing the effect of police perjury on the validity of a warrant.
The substantive-procedural dichotomy is further called into question if
the above facts are modified slightly to make the error appear more substan-
tive. For instance, in lieu of denying the perjury claim without a hearing,
suppose that the trial court holds a hearing on the truthfulness of the facts set
forth in the affidavit, and finds that the affidavit is materially perjurious. The
court, nevertheless, denies the motion to suppress because a state rule requires
an affidavit to be judged on its face in determining its sufficiency to establish
probable cause. Most lower federal courts would classify the application of an
erroneous fourth amendment standard as substantive and would therefore bar
habeas corpus review. 174  There is, however, no apparent reason why the
168. 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1977).
169. The so-called "Petillo rule," see State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 173, 293 A.2d 649, 653
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). was not reviewed by the Third Circuit, 562 F.2d at 905
n.3, but has been cited in Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978), for the proposition: "If the state provides no corrective
procedures at all to redress Fourth Amendment violations, federal habeas corpus remains avail-
able." Id. at 840.
170. 61 N.J. 165, 173, 293 A.2d 649, 653 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
171. Albanese v. State, No. A 2989 71 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ap. Div. 1973), certif. denied, 64
N.J. 312, 315 A.2d 401 (1973).
172. See notes 159-60 and accompanying text supra.
173. See United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686, 688-89 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1977); note 169 supra. Cf. generally Gates v.
Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d. Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038
(1978).
174. See text accompanying notes 117-24 supra.
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availability of habeas corpus review in these two cases should turn on whether
or not a hearing was held prior to denial of the claim.
The decision of the Second Circuit in Kahn v. Flood 75 further illustrates
the mutable nature of the distinction between procedural and substantive
error when used to implement Stone's exception. Habeas applicants chal-
lenged a search warrant, contending that the affidavit submitted in its support
contained material misstatements based on lies told to the affiant by his
informant. 176 The Kahn petitioners claimed that habeas review was permissi-
ble under the Stone exception because the state court had refused to hear
evidence relevant to the truthfulness of the information supplied by the in-
formant. 177 The district court denied relief. The Second Circuit determined
that false statements of an informant contained in an affidavit would not
invalidate a warrant under either the state or federal rules. It affirmed the
denial of habeas relief on the basis of Stone.
Since there is no difference between the state and federal rules
on this point, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the New
York courts afforded them anything less than a full and fair hearing
on their Fourth Amendment claim. Stone v. Powell ... thus bars
this attempt to relitigate that claim in a federal forum.
178
Why the Kahn court evaluated the correctness of the state rule is not
entirely clear. Apparently, once the court classified the petitioner's claim of an
erroneous evidentiary limitation as procedural, such an inquiry was de-
manded. A substantive classification would not have triggered an inquiry into
the merits of the rule. 179 This procedural classification is questionable, how-
ever, if the essence of the claim involved is viewed as an attack on the state
courts' interpretation and application of a fourth amendment rule governing
primary police conduct. Surely, habeas applicants should not be able to avoid
the impediment of Stone merely by couching substantive claims in terms of
erroneous evidentiary limitations. On the other hand, it may well be that the
court actually viewed the essence of the claim as procedural, since it related to
the judicial process for obtaining search warrants. This reading, if accurate,
only further demonstrates the tenuousness of the substantive-procedural dis-
tinction. It may be recalled that the circuit court in Wolff, Stone's companion
case, granted habeas relief on the same type of claim-the improper issuance
of a search warrant-and the Supreme Court reversed without any inquiry
into the merits. 180
More basically, the lower courts do not present any underlying purpose
for making the distinction between substance and process. The distinction is
clearly irrelevant to the thesis, to be advanced in the next part, that limited
175. 550 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1977).
176. Id. at 784.
177. Id. at 784-85.
178. Id. at 786.
179. See text accompanying notes 182-83 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
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fourth amendment habeas review is justified by the need for federal oversight
to ensure that the states and their courts satisfy their constitutional obligation
to protect the collective fourth amendment rights of their citizens. There is no
reason to assume that a procedural, as opposed to a substantive, error indi-
cates a failure to meet this obligation. Neither is there reason to assume the
converse.
III. A THEORY OF LIMITED HABEAS CoRPus REViEw OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE CLAIMS
As we have seen, the Stone majority opinion rests on three essential
propositions: the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is police deter-
rence, the accused does not have a personal constitutional right to application
of the rule, and the deterrent benefits attainable from the rule's application in
collateral proceedings are outweighed by the attendant social costs.' 8 ' These
propositions are defensible. But stated without qualification and taken seri-
ously, they imply a complete ban on habeas consideration of exclusionary rule
claims. 8 2 Stone, however, by creating an exception to its ban on habeas
review, implicitly qualified this trilogy of premises. The ban imposed on
application of the exclusionary rule in federal collateral proceedings must be
reconciled with the Court's explicit reaffirmation of the rule's binding effect
in state court proceedings and on direct review in the Supreme Court.
8 3
Since the general rule in Stone barring federal habeas corpus review rests on a
construction of the fourth amendment (as incorporated in the fourteenth),
8 4
the exception and the different treatment of the rule on direct review presum-
ably must also be rooted in the Constitution. Accordingly, this part of the
Article suggests a theory of the fourth amendment that reconciles this differ-
ential treatment'8 8 and justifies the Stone exception.
181. See text accompanying notes 27-92 supra.
182. A state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if he is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). Stone holds that a person whose conviction is based
upon the admission of illegally seized evidence is not entitled to collateral relief; his constitutional
rights were not violated by use of such evidence and, therefore, his custody is not unconstitu-
tional. 428 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, it should make no constitutional difference whether or not a
defendant received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his exclusion claim. Nevertheless, Stone
permits habeas corpus review where this opportunity has been denied.
183. 428 U.S. at 479-82, 486.
184. For example, Stone explicitly held that "the Constitution does not require" the grant-
ing of federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner convicted on the basis of the admission of
illegally seized evidence. Id. at 482.
185. Some commentators have suggested that constitutional grounds cannot explain Stone's
different treatment of exclusionary rule claims on direct versus collateral review. To these
commentators, the different treatment represents judicial rewriting of the habeas corpus statute,
which the Court refused to acknowledge. See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Anal-
yses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1301, 1316-18 (1978). I have chosen
instead to take the Court at its word, in the hope that this course will lead to the elucidation of a
coherent rationale employable in future cases.
1982]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
A. The Differential Treatment of Exclusionary Rule Claims on Collateral
Review
In his Stone dissent, Justice Brennan argues that the disparity in the
majority's treatment of exclusionary rule claims on direct versus collateral
review is constitutionally unsupportable. 186 According to his reasoning, until
Mapp v. Ohio 87 is overruled, constitutional error occurs whenever evidence
that has been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is introduced at
trial. 188 If the error is not corrected on appeal, he finds no logic to support a
view that it "suddenly dissipates" when raised in a habeas corpus action. 8
This criticism, however, refuses to accept the Court's proposition that the
exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy designed to deter police violations of
the fourth amendment, and not a personal constitutional right of the accused.
Given that proposition, a person convicted on the basis of illegally seized
evidence has not suffered an unconstitutional conviction and, consequently, is
not being held in "custody in violation of the Constitution" within the
meaning of the habeas corpus statute. 90 From the defendant's perspective,
the constitutional error did not suddenly vanish when raised collaterally; it
never existed.' 9 '
Constitutional error is absent, according to the Court, because applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule comes too late to prevent constitutional injury,
which occurs at the time of the illegal search or seizure.192  Further, exclusion
does not provide compensatory redress to victims of illegal searches and
seizures. The benefits accrue to a select class of victims, i.e., persons charged
with crime, and, however calculated, the benefits are not proportionate or
responsive to the underlying constitutional injury. 9 3  This reasoning, how-
ever, casts doubt on the Court's constitutional authority to impose the exclu-
sionary rule on state court proceedings: if the exclusionary rule does not
186. 428 U.S. at 502-06 & 510 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
188. 428 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 509-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
191. Justice Brennan also questions whether the facts support the discrimination between
direct and collateral review. Seizing upon an intimation by the majority that the diminution in
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on collateral review is in part due to the usually lengthy
interval between the alleged police misconduct and collateral review, he maintains that "it is
difficult to see how the Court could constitutionalize any such asserted temporal distinctions,
particularly in light of the differential speed with which criminal cases proceed even on direct
appeal." 428 U.S. at 509 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Conceding the accuracy of this observa-
tion, however, does not substantially dilute the force of the Court's principal factual contention,
which was that the deterrent effect of collateral review is negligible because the police will not fear
that a federal habeas court will uncover an illegal search or seizure that went undetected at trial or
on appeal.
192. As Justice Powell observed, exclusion "is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any '[r]eparation comes too late.' "428 U.S. at
486 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)).
193. In the Court's cost-benefit analysis, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he disparity in
particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a
guilty defendant by application of the [exclusionary] rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality
that is essential to the concept of justice." 428 U.S. at 490.
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prevent or repair constitutional harm to the accused, what then is the source
of the Court's power to require state adherence to the rule? 9 4
The explanation is to be found in the Court's two-tier view of the fourth
amendment. On the one hand, the amendment assures to each individual a
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, the
Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics'5 that the victim of a fourth amendment violation by federal
officers has a cause of action under the amendment for damages against the
persons responsible. Furthermore, this action is maintainable without regard
to the deterrent effect of such damage actions on future police misconduct.9 6
The remedy is instead intended to provide compensation for injuries suffered
as a result of unconstitutional conduct. 91 On the other hand, the fourth
amendment also commands government to regulate law enforcement activities
in a manner protective of the people's collective security against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
98
The Stone Court interprets the ruling in Mapp, which made the exclusion-
ary rule binding upon the states, as an outgrowth of this latter command. The
states are constitutionally obligated to take measures designed to protect the
collective fourth amendment rights of their citizens. Otherwise, if nothing is
done, the police, in their zeal to apprehend suspected criminals, will ignore the
commands of the fourth amendment to such a degree as to render meaningless
the guarantee of collective security. 99 Exclusion is one effective means to
obtain police respect for the fourth amendment rights of the people, and it
may be the only effective means available to a court. Although suppression of
evidence on fourth amendment grounds often provides a windfall for a crimi-
nal defendant, enabling him to escape a deserved conviction, this is thought
necessary to motivate him, and others similarly situated, to bring to light and
to deter unconstitutional police conduct. Operation of the exclusionary rule
places the criminal defendant in the role of private attorney general, acting to
vindicate the fourth amendment rights of all.
The Constitution does not require the exclusionary rule, as opposed to
some alternative method, to implement the fourth amendment's guarantee of
collective security. What is required is "something that works' 20 to effectu-
194. The Supreme Court, of course, possesses no supervisory power over the state courts.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Consequently, its authority
to impose the exclusionary rule on the states must be derived from a constitutional source. In
contrast, the Court's authority to restrict the admission of evidence in federal prosecutions is not
circumscribed by this constraint. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See
generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 181 (1969).
195. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
196. Id. at 395-97. The Court in Bivens reasoned that the victim's right to receive compensa-
tion for the injury to his privacy interests is independent from the incidental consequences of
according monetary relief. Id. Cf. generally id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring); Schrock &
Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117, 1135-38 (1978).
197. 403 U.S. at 395-97.
198. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367-72
(1974).
199. Id. at 433.
200. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 (1974). See
generally Monaghan, supra note 68, at 1-10.
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ate fourth amendment values, whether created by the courts or another
branch of government, and there is considerable flexibility regarding the
manner of operation of the mechanism selected. Since the exclusionary rule
constitutes a prophylactic measure, rather than a delineation of a constitu-
tional right, the Court may withhold enforcement of the rule on habeas
corpus, while continuing to enforce it against the states on direct appeal,
because of a prudential judgment about the relative utility of the rule's
application in these contexts.
B. Justification of the Exception
When the basis of Stone is understood as a utilitarian judgment about the
enforcement of collective fourth amendment rights, why should it make a
constitutional difference in the context of habeas corpus review whether a
state has or has not provided an "opportunity for full and fair litigation"?
Permitting collateral review in this circumstance cannot be traced to any
personal constitutional right of the accused. A state could refuse entirely to
permit defendants to challenge prosecutorial evidence on fourth amendment
grounds without transgressing upon their personal constitutional rights.2 01
Neither is the exception explainable on the basis of police deterrence. Stone
asserts that postconviction review has negligible deterrent effect, because the
police will not fear that a previously undetected fourth amendment violation
will be disclosed in collateral proceedings.20 2 If this assumption about police
psychology is correct, then, as Justice Brennan points out, it follows that the
police will not fear that "habeas review might reveal that the state courts had
denied the defendant an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on his
claim." 2 03
There is, however, an alternative hypothesis to elucidate the exception.
Prior to Stone, habeas corpus review of fourth amendment exclusionary rule
claims was routinely available. The practice was discontinued by the Court for
two reasons: (1) exclusion is not a personal constitutional right of the accused,
and (2) application of the exclusionary rule by state judges at trial and on
appeal is adequate to achieve the rule's deterrent objective.20 4 The Stone
Court may have deemed routine habeas corpus review of state fourth amend-
ment decisions inadvisable, given that state court adjudication of fourth
amendment issues is presently adequate. It does not follow, however, that
federal collateral review of exclusionary rule claims should be foreclosed
entirely. Such review should remain available, where necessary, to ensure that
states and their courts continue to meet their constitutional responsibility to
safeguard collective fourth amendment rights. While direct review in the
Supreme Court may be sufficient to elaborate fourth amendment doctrine, it
is inadequate for this regulatory purpose. 205
201. The state would, nevertheless, have a constitutional obligation to implement collective
fourth amendment rights by other means.
202. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
203. 428 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
205. See text accompanying notes 80-92 supra.
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Accordingly, the Stone exception should be construed as providing the
lower federal courts with leverage to ensure adequate implementation by the
states of the fourth amendment protections. Depending on how the exception
is defined, this interpretation is not inconsistent with the Court's expression of
confidence in the good faith and intellectual ability of state judges to decide
search and seizure claims.2 0 6 These judicial attributes are not relevant where
state legislatures do not enact or repeal procedures for raising and litigating
fourth amendment suppression motions. Thus, there would be no inconsis-
tency if the inquiry of the habeas courts under the exception were limited to
whether the state provided procedures to raise and litigate the suppression
claims.
It is not necessary, however, to construe the exception so narrowly. It is
well to remember that the Court's confidence in state judges is based on their
record of fourth amendment adjudication under a system where "the threat of
habeas serve[d] as a[n] ... additional incentive for trial and appellate courts
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with
established constitutional standards. ' 20 7 Consequently, one may concede the
inadvisability of having federal collateral review available for every state court
denial of a fourth amendment claim, without conceding to the imposition of a
nearly absolute ban on such review. What is needed is an interpretation of the
exception that gives the federal courts limited authority to intervene through
habeas corpus in order to ensure the adequate protection of collective fourth
amendment rights.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT HABEAS CoRPus REviEw
Critical to the selection of a rule governing the cognizability of fourth
amendment exclusion claims is the effect of that rule on the implementation
of collective fourth amendment rights. Accordingly, habeas corpus relief
should be available under Stone's exception to correct judicial errors which, if
otherwise uncorrected, could lead to diminished police adherence to fourth
amendment values and a consequential loss of collective security. These errors
may be termed "systemic," in that their occurrence is, or is likely to become,
widespread among the courts of a particular state. An apt illustration is where
a state's highest court has announced an erroneous and fertile fourth amend-
ment rule of decision.
Habeas corpus review of fourth amendment errors by state courts of a
systemic nature is necessary because such errors will tend to legitmate uncon-
stitutional actions in the eyes of law enforcement and thus increase their
incidence.2 0 8 In some cases, an erroneous judicial decision will directly and
206. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
207. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. Judicial exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence authoritatively disavows the unconsti-
tutional conduct and reaffirms the values of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., J. Feinberg, Doing
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immediately effect the propagation of unconstitutional police action. For
example, suppose a state supreme court interprets a state statute as authoriz-
ing random stops of motorists to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registra-
tions. The court further holds that the statute is consistent with the fourth
amendment, and affirms a conviction for possession of illegal drugs discov-
ered incident to a random stop under the statute. 20 9 If the fourth amendment
decision is erroneous, every motorist and passenger in the state is threatened
with an "unreasonable seizure. 2 1 0  Consequently, habeas review is appropri-
ate given the significant impact of the decision on the privacy interest of so
many persons.
It is not necessary that the impact on collective security be as immediate
or as broad as that illustrated in the previous case to justify the availability of
habeas review. Nevertheless, not every erroneous fourth amendment decision
by a state court is likely to have systemic consequences. For instance, an
erroneous application of fourth amendment principles by a state trial court
should ordinarily not be subject to habeas review unless there is some reason
to believe that the error would have a meaningful effect on future judicial
decisions or the conduct of the police. Even an erroneous fourth amendment
decision by a state's highest court in a reported decision is not necessarily
systemic, since it may have virtually no precedential significance, e.g., where
the rule of decision is limited to unique facts unlikely to recur.
When presented with a fourth amendment claim, a federal habeas court
should first ask if the alleged error is systemic. If the answer is negative, the
court should deny relief. If the answer is affirmative, the court should decide
and Deserving 101-04 (1970). The converse is also true, as Chief Justice Warren observed in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial ... has the necessary
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence. . . ." Id. at 13. Moreover,
empirical evidence supports the proposition that law enforcement officials perceive exclusion of
evidence as the embodiment of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment?, 62 Jud. 66, 69-73 (1978).
209. The Nebraska Supreme Court reached this conclusion on these facts in State v. Holm-
berg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975). Although the district court granted habeas corpus
relief, the Eighth Circuit reversed and reasoned that Stone precluded the federal courts from
reaching the merits. Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977).
210. Judge Bright dissented in the Holmberg decision and urged review of the merits of the
fourth amendment issue, since the case presented "important and unsettled constitutional issues"
that had not received federal review. 548 F.2d at 749 (Bright, J., dissenting). He further con-
tended that Stone did not preclude federal collateral review, because
the constitutional issue here is not whether, on a particular set of facts, a police officer
... invaded an individual's fourth amendment rights for here the police officer acted
pursuant to a general state policy enacted by statute.
In a sense, [petitioner] represents every motorist travelling the highways of this Nation.
The authority which Nebraska claims for its highway patrolmen threatens everyone's
freedom of movement in a motor vehicle.
Id. at 748-49 (Bright, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court subsequently held unconstitutional such
discretionary random stops to check driver's license and vehicle registration. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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the merits of the claim. In most instances, federal judges will be able to
determine this question based on an examination of the pleadings and any
state court opinions rendered in the case. If a habeas petitioner claims that the
error in his case is systemic because of its frequent occurrence in state judicial
decisions, the respondent should have the burden of demonstrating otherwise.
The suggested approach does not require federal courts to define the
minimal level of fourth amendment implementation permissible under the
Constitution, nor to measure the level of police compliance with fourth
amendment dictates. These determinations probably cannot be made. More-
over, courts are able to act without them, as evidenced by the extreme rough-
ness of the cost-benefit calculus used by the Court in Stone to differentiate
between application of the exclusionary rule on direct versus collateral re-
view, 21' and by the imprecision of the Court's standard for implementing
Stone's exception.
212
The focus on systemic error also clarifies the appropriate disposition of
fourth amendment claims that are not litigated on the merits in state court.
When state courts do not decide a fourth amendment claim because of proce-
dural defaults attributable to the defendant, some habeas courts have advo-
cated use of the "cause and prejudice" standard to determine whether the
default should be excused. 213  Other courts have barred collateral review
without regard to either the reason for or prejudicial effect of the forfeiture,
so long as state processes for the adjudication of fourth amendment claims,
including rules of procedural forfeiture, afforded a reasonable opportunity
for litigation.214 Since the corrective-process approach concentrates on the
system of exclusionary rule enforcement, while the "cause and prejudice"
standard bears upon the circumstances of a particular litigant, the former
approach is the appropriate one in cases of the defendant's procedural de-
fault.
The state courts' failure to decide the merits is not always attributable to
the defendant, e.g., when a fourth amendment claim is not decided because of
judicial oversight. 21 5 In this circumstance, some courts have granted habeas
corpus review since the particular defendant was denied an opportunity to
litigate.2 1 6 Other courts, however, have denied collateral review unless the
judicial error that prevented actual litigation of the claim occurred "routinely
or systematically. 2 1 7 The latter approach is preferable because of its sys-
temic focus.
The doctrinal justification of Stone advanced here provides a basis for
interpretation of the exception .2 1  Nevertheless, Stone is difficult to rational-
211. See notes 75-92 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 93-115 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 154-58 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 159-63 and accompanying text supra.
215. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
216. See, e.g., note 164 supra.
217. See notes 165-66 and accompanying text supra.
218. It is also consistent with the Court's holdings as to non-fourth amendment claims. See
notes 224-50 and accompanying text infra.
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ize fully, primarily for the reasons suggested in a hypothetical posed by Justice
White in dissent.219 Two confederates are separately tried for a state crime
and convicted on the same evidence. Both raise identical claims that essential
prosecution evidence was seized in violation of their fourth amendment rights,
and these claims are rejected by the state courts after careful consideration.
One of these individuals is denied Supreme Court review of his conviction.
The other obtains Supreme Court review and a reversal of his conviction
based on the application of established fourth amendment law to undisputed
facts. The state has no case without the excluded evidence, so he goes free.
The first then petitions for habeas corpus, contending that his fourth amend-
ment claim was erroneously decided, citing the Supreme Court's decision in
his accomplice's case. The petition is dismissed on the basis of Stone.
Acceptance of the validity of Stone's underlying propositions-that ex-
clusion is not a personal right of the accused, that judicial remedies may be
appropriately afforded to litigants for purposes of realizing social goals rather
than personal justice, and that uneven treatment of exclusion claims on direct
as opposed to collateral review has a rational basis-however, does not pro-
duce comfortable acceptance of the outcome in the hypothetical. Equal treat-
ment of similarly situated individuals is a core value of our conventional
morality, and for courts to act in a manner contrary to this value, albeit in
rational pursuit of desirable social goals, tends to weaken this value and
makes us uneasy. We too could fall victim to unequal treatment at the hands
of the courts in the pursuit of the general good. This adverse impact does not
figure in the Court's cost-benefit analysis, perhaps because any weight as-
signed would be arbitrary or, more fundamentally, because equal treatment of
persons is a principle not readily subject to defeasance on instrumental
grounds in our legal culture.
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF STONE
A. Enforcement of the Exclusionary Rule Against the States
Notwithstanding Stone's reaffirmation of the binding effect of the exclu-
sionary rule on the states, two factors pose questions for the continued
imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the states: the Stone Court's rejec-
tion of the personal constitutional right rationale in favor of deterrence, and
the Court's balancing analysis. A hypothetical illustrates these issues. Suppose
a police department establishes a program of internal education, regulation,
and sanctions, designed to induce adherence to fourth amendment limitations
on police conduct. Despite the program, however, an officer engages in an
unconstitutional search and discovers evidence of criminal conduct by the
victim of the fourth amendment violation. Over the defendant's objection, the
state courts permit reliance on this evidence for conviction, using the rationale
219. 428 U.S. at 536-37.
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that the accused has no personal right to exclude the evidence and that the
departmental program is an adequate substitute for the exclusionary rule.
What is the appropriate standard for determining the adequacy of the
departmental program? One approach would require the state to demonstrate
that the departmental program is as effective as or more effective than the
exclusionary rule in maintaining police conformity with the dictates of the
fourth amendment. The constitutional logic for this position would be that the
fourth amendment requires government to offer a minimum level of practical
protection for fourth amendment guarantees, i.e., that attainable through use
of the exclusionary rule. A comparison of the deterrent effectiveness of the
two regimes, however, is probably not possible because of difficulties in data
collection.
2 0
Now assume that the state concedes that the departmental program is a
less effective deterrent than exclusion. It is by no means clear that a majority
of the current Court would demand continued adherence to the exclusionary
rule in this circumstance. Stone's balancing analysis teaches that comparative
costs as well as benefits are relevant in determining the utility and, thus, the
necessity of the exclusionary rule in various fora. 221 The logic also dictates
that comparative costs are relevant to determining if a particular mechanism is
an adequate replacement for the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, the greater
likelihood is that the Court would accept the police program as an adequate
substitute for the exclusionary rule on a plausible showing that the former
exacts less social cost than the latter, and that this reduction offsets the
former's diminished deterrent effectiveness.
A deterrent mechanism must presumably achieve some minimum level of
police conformity with fourth amendment values in order to satisfy the thresh-
old of fourth amendment implementation. If zero social cost could offset zero
deterrent benefit, the Stone majority would not have reaffirmed the continued
enforcement of the exclusionary rule against the states. The intuitive and
rough calculus endorsed by the Court as a basis for differentiating between
application of the exclusionary rule on collateral review, as opposed to at trial
and on direct review, would appear, however, to leave considerable discretion
to the states to devise alternatives to, or modifications of, the exclusionary
rule.2 2 2 Less effective measures involving lower social cost may well satisfy
the Court's constitutional balance point. Indeed, it appears that a majority of
the Stone Court would accept almost any good faith effort on the part of the
states to find a substitute for the exclusionary rule.
2 2 3
220. See Oaks, supra note 77, at 712-16.
221. See text accompanying notes 75-92 supra.
222. For a discussion of alternatives, and modifications of the exclusionary rule, see Geller,
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 Wash.
U.L.Q. 621, 689-722.
223. One factor militating against abandonment of the exclusionary rule, until an alternative
deterrent mechanism is implemented, is the concern that this might be misinterpreted by the police
as an implicit repeal of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice
Burger, one of the rule's harshest critics, has observed that "the public interest would be poorly
1982]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
B. Habeas Corpus Litigation of Non-Fourth Amendment Claims
1. Claims unrelated to guilt or innocence. Some have asserted that Stone
presages a revisionist movement, led by Justice Powell, to limit the substantive
scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to claims bearing upon the integ-
rity of the factfinding process underlying a conviction. 24  According to this
interpretation, the fundamental principle of Stone is statedin footnote 31 of
the Court's opinion: 225  "Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes
other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss
of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of
government. '2 26  Justice Powell vigorously supported this principle in his
earlier concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 7 in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in urging that the central
role of the habeas corpus remedy is to ensure that "no innocent man suffers
an unconstitutional loss of liberty. ' 228 Acceptance of this reasoning leads to
the withdrawal of habeas corpus relief for claims unrelated to the reliability of
the guilt-determination process.
Although Stone reached the result advocated by Justice Powell in
Schneckloth,29 the Court in Stone did not lay the groundwork for an abridge-
ment of the substantive scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction based upon a
guilt-determinative threshold. As noted, Stone rests on judgments regarding
the justification and utility of the exclusionary rule, rather than on the kind of
revisionist interpretation of the substantive scope of habeas corpus advocated
served if law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression, however erroneous, that
all constitutional restraints on police had somehow been removed-that an open season on
criminals had been declared." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
224. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 583-84 n.16 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); note 4
supra.
225. Cover & Aleinikoff, note 4 supra, at 1086.
226. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
227. 412 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). For instance, Justice Powell
wrote: "That federal courts would actually redetermine constitutional claims bearing no relation
to the prisoner's innocence with the possibility of releasing him from custody if [a] search is held
unlawful not only defeats our societal interest in a rational legal system but serves no compensat-
ing ends of personal justice." Id. at 258 (Powell, J., concurring). This view had been advocated
earlier by Justice Black in his dissent in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231-42 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting), where he rejected the court's holding that federal prisoners could raise
fourth amendment claims in collateral proceedings.
I would not let any criminal conviction become invulnerable to collateral attack where
there is left remaining the probability or possibility that constitutional commands related
to the integrity of the fact-finding process have been violated. In such situations society
has failed to perform its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.
Id. at 241 (Black, J., dissenting).
228. 412 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring).
229. In his Schneckloth concurrence, Justice Powell advocated that "the inquiry of the
federal court on habeas review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim should be confined
solely to the question whether the defendant was provided a fair opportunity in the state courts to
raise and have adjudicated the Fourth Amendment claim." Id. at 266 (Powell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 82:1
HABEAS CORPUS
by Justice Powell's Schneckloth concurrence.2 30 The detrimental effect of
exclusion on the factfinding process, to be sure, was a factor in the utilitarian
balance. It was not, however, the fundamental premise of the decision.23' The
Stone Court stated that its decision "is not concerned with the scope of the
habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims gener-
ally."2
32
The Court's subsequent decision in Rose v. Mitchell2 33 provides further
evidence that a majority of the Court is unwilling to rewrite the habeas corpus
statute to conform to the view expressed by Justice Powell in Schneckloth. A
question addressed in Rose was whether Stone "should be extended so as to
foreclose a grant of federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner on the
ground of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. ' 2 34 The composi-
tion of the petit jury was not challenged, nor was any other claim raised which
affected the reliability of the guilt determination. Consequently, it was argued
that Stone's logic precluded habeas corpus relief. The Rose Court rejected this
extension of Stone explaining that the ruling in Stone was confined "to cases
involving the judicially created exclusionary rule. 2 35  Significantly, Justice
230. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Stone contrasts markedly with his earlier
concurring opinion in Schneckloth. In Schneckloth, Justice Powell drew primarily upon the views
of Judge Friendly and Professor Bator and urged that the Court's interpretation of the substan-
tive scope of the writ of habeas corpus in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), was overbroad.
There, the Court indicated that habeas jurisdiction encompassed constitutional claims generally.
See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 142 (1970); note 110 supra.
Professor Bator's thesis is that the Court's decision in Brown v. Allen marked a radical
departure from precedent without any historical or policy justification. Emphasizing the impor-
tance of finality in criminal proceedings and stressing that no legal system can ever determine a
defendant's guilt or innocence with absolute certainty, Bator argues that judicial inquiry on a writ
of habeas corpus should be limited to whether the state provided adequate process for the
litigation of the defendant's constitutional claims. See generally Bator, supra note 108. Judge
Friendly urges a reduction in the substantive scope of the writ for different reasons, i.e., that the
writ, historically, was intended to remedy unjust confinement. Accordingly, he advocates the
limitation of cognizable claims on federal habeas corpus to those affecting the reliability of the
guilt determination in the particular conviction under attack, and would exclude fourth amend-
ment suppression claims. See generally Friendly, supra.
Justice Powell's analysis in Schneckloth reflects an amalgamation of these two views. Collat-
eral litigation of fourth amendment claims is felt undesirable because it does not affect the
reliability of the guilt-determination process (Friendly's thesis). Nevertheless, fourth amendment
claims should be cognizable where the state does not provide an opportunity for their full and fair
litigation (Bator's thesis).
The concerns of Bator and Friendly also appear in Stone's balancing analysis. One of the
additional costs of applying the exclusionary rule collaterally is impairment of the value of
"finality in criminal trials." 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. One of the costs of applying the rule at any
juncture is the diversion of the criminal proceeding from the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence, and the loss of typically reliable evidence if suppression is granted. Id. at 490.
231. It has been suggested that Justice Powell's shift in emphasis from the guilt-determina-
tive threshold in Schneckloth to the utilitarian analysis of the exclusionary rule in Stone was
necessary to attract a majority of the Court. See Boyze, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v.
Powell: A Remedy Only for the Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. Rich. L.R. 291, 311-15 (1977); Soloff,
Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6
Hofstra L. Rev. 297, 307-09 (1978).
232. 428 U.S. at 494 n.37 (emphasis in original).
233. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
234. Id. at 559.
235. Id. at 560.
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Powell, arguing against habeas corpus consideration of the grand jury claim,
relied primarily on his Schneckloth concurrence, rather than on Stone, to
support the view that habeas corpus reviews should not be routinely available
for claims unrelated to guilt or innocence.2 3,
2. Claims founded on prophylactic rules. Stone is not authority for
limiting habeas corpus review of non-guilt-related claims. Nevertheless, it
does provide a doctrinal basis for curtailing collateral litigation of certain
claims which, akin to fourth amendment exclusioh, rest on judge-made rules
designed to foster constitutionally rooted interests, but which are neither
delineations of personal constitutional rights nor indispensable to their protec-
tion. Observing that these rules, althouih derived from constitutional guaran-
tees, are not unalterably essential to their realization, one constitutional com-
mentator describes them as "constitutional common law" to denote the
availability of legislative modification and alternatives. 23 7  The Mapp23a ex-
clusionary rule, the Miranda v. Arizona239 mandate of warnings to persons in
custody, and the Wade v. United States240 requirement of the presence of
defense counsel at line-ups are within this category of special constitutional
rules. The salient characteristic common to all is that they represent a practical
and prudential choice permitting of alternatives. The Court has acknowledged
that Miranda and Wade are subject to modification or abrogation by alterna-
tive mechanisms that facilitate the underlying constitutional interests served
by their rulings. 241 Similarly, the decision in Stone to limit the application of
the exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review, while retaining the rule in full
force and effect at state trials and on direct review, testifies to its variability.
236. Id. at 583 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell sought to rationalize Stone's em-
phasis of the point that the exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy rather than a personal
constitutional right with his position in Rose, as follows:
To be sure, in Stone v. Powell ... we emphasized that the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule was a "judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional
right." We did so, however, only in rejecting the suggestion of the dissent that our
decision would lead to a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction" ... , the
extent of which might be unlimited. Stone recognized that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule was not designed to protect the right of an individual to be free from
unjust conviction. Thus, the justification for undermining the finality of state-court
judgments that exists in many habeas corpus actions was absent. Properly understood,
therefore, the rationale of our decision in Stone is not only consistent with denying
collateral relief for claims of unfair indictment, but actually presages such a limitation
on habeas corpus.
Id. at 587-88 n.10.
237. Monaghan, supra note 67, at 1-10, 18-26. For a critique of Professor Monaghan's
theory of subconstitutional rulemaking by the Court, see Schrock & Welsh, supra note 29.
238. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
239. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). The Miranda rules
effectuate a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.
240. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Wade rules guard against suggestive identification procedures
and protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.




Conceding that Stone provides a doctrinal basis for limiting or banning
habeas review of claims asserted under the Miranda or Wade rule242 is not to
counsel the wisdom of doing so. The latter judgment requires careful evalua-
tion of the positive and negative effects of the prophylactic rule at issue and
the likely consequences of restricting collateral litigation of claims asserted
under such rule.
By way of illustration, compare and contrast Miranda with Mapp claims.
The Miranda Court prescribed warnings that the police must afford a suspect
in custody in order for inculpatory statements obtained through interrogation
to be admissible into evidence. Miranda thus couples two prophylactic rules: a
procedural safeguard, in the form of required warnings, to effectuate the
constitutional guarantee against compelled incrimination; and an exclusionary
remedy to enforce the warning requirement. Prior to the Miranda decision,
the admissibility of confessions was governed by an elusive due process,
voluntariness standard. Under this standard, detailed judicial inquiry into the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of an inculpatory
statement was required to determine both the confession's reliability and the
acceptability of the police methods used. 243  Miranda was predicated on
several objectives. First, the police received concrete guidance encouraging
self-regulation designed to protect the constitutional rights of suspects and
reasonably to ensure the admissibility of confessions properly obtained Sec-
ondly, the lower courts were given easily applicable rules of decision for a
broad spectrum of cases. Finally, the Supreme Court was relieved of detailed,
case-by-case factual analysis in reviewing confession challenges. In contrast,
none of these positive aspects accompanied the decision in Mapp to make the
exclusionary rule binding on the states. Mapp only contained a remedial
component and did nothing to clarify the very general constitutional prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures for either the police or the
courts.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the balancing of costs and benefits involved
in determining if Miranda claims should be fully reviewable on habeas differs
significantly from the calculus elaborated in Stone for Mapp claims.2 44 To
242. Chief Justice Burger has advocated the withdrawal of habeas corpus review for
Miranda claims because of their prophylactic nature. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 423-
24 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The lower federal courts, however, have declined invitations
to extend Stone's barrier to Miranda claims. See, e.g., Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945
(1979). But see Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1976), which held as an
alternative ground for decision that the petitioner made no claim of innocence and that his
Miranda claim did not go to the basic justness of his conviction.
The Chief Justice has also urged that sixth amendment claims not impugning the integrity of
factfinding should not be cognizable on habeas review. This stance adopts the position taken in
Justice Powell's Schneckloth concurrence that habeas corpus relief should be limited to those
claims which affect the reliability of the guilt-determination process. See Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 425-27 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
243. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
244. See notes 75-92 and accompanying text supra.
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begin with, the effects of Miranda and Mapp claims on the reliability of guilt
determination vary substantially. The exclusion of statements necessitated by
a Miranda violation frequently enhances reliability, 45 while enforcement of
the Mapp rule almost never does.2 46 Rather, the latter typically has precisely
the opposite effect-it deprives the factfinder of reliable and probative evi-
dence. 247 Thus, regarding reliability, implementation of Miranda's exclusion-
ary rule entails both greater benefit and less cost than its Mapp counterpart.
Moreover, other factors that the Stone Court found to militate in favor
of limiting collateral review of Mapp claims are not applicable to Miranda
claims. The holding in Stone largely eliminates federal litigation of claims by
state prisoners that their convictions rest on fourth amendment violations.2 48
The elimination of such litigation, the Stone Court believed, was beneficial in
at least two respects.2 49  First, by removing a potential source of friction
between the state and federal judiciaries, it positively affects state-federal
relations. Second, it alleviates the workload of the federal judiciary. In con-
trast, however, extension of Stone's holding to Miranda claims, would accom-
plish neither objective, and might even produce opposite results. Habeas
petitioners predictably would respond to a curtailment in the availability of
habeas for raising Miranda claims by claiming that their confessions were
involuntary. Consequently, federal courts would be required to return to the
old due process standard with its case-by-case sifting of circumstances relevant
to voluntariness. Given the uncertainty and unpredictability in such a case-by-
case examination of circumstances, the friction consequent upon disagree-
ments between federal and state courts would be unavoidable and significant.
Accordingly, it is by no means clear that prudence dictates extending
Stone's holding to Miranda claims. It is similarly unclear whether its extension
to Wade claims is justified. 250 In sum, before undertaking to extend Stone's
barrier to other claims based on prophylactic rules, the Court should (a)
245. Although an important, if not primary, objective of the Miranda decision was to ensure
the voluntariness and reliability of custodial statements, its exclusionary rule is over-inclusive.
That is, not all confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are either involuntary or unreliable.
See generally Schulhofer, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 890-91 (1981).
246. This statement is qualified, because not all evidentiary fruits of unreasonable searches
or seizures are reliable and probative. For example, an out-of-court, eye-witness identification
which grows out of an unconstitutional arrest may have been so suggestive as to be unreliable
evidence. The essential point, however, is that it was not made so as a result of the fourth
amendment violation.
247. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
248. Habeas petitioners have unsuccessfully attempted to convert consent-to-search issues
into Miranda claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States ex rel. Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 617-18 (D. Conn. 1978).
249. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
250. For example, Wade's requirement that counsel be present at post-indictment line-ups
serves objectives similar to those of Miranda. The reliability of the trial process is improved by
deterring the police from using suggestive identification procedures, and by facilitating effective
defense cross-examination at trial. Wade also provides courts and law enforcement officials with
an over-inclusive, bright-line rule to supplement an underlying due process right governed by a
totality-of-the-circumstances test. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Accordingly, preclu-
sion of habeas litigation of counsel claims under Wade would likely produce an increase in the
number of due process claims in which petitioners assert that the police employed unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures conducive to irreparable misidentification.
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identify and weigh the costs and benefits of the particular rule at issue, (b)
determine whether the precluded claim is readily transformable into another
claim that would be cognizable on habeas corpus, and (c) weigh the relative
costs and benefits of adjudicating the two types of claims.
CONCLUSION
Stone's limitation on federal collateral review of fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule claims reflects a utilitarian judgment concerning the compara-
tive deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in various fora. Its prem-
ises are plausible: that exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment is not a personal constitutional right; that the exclusionary rule is
a judicially created mechanism designed to deter fourth amendment violations
generally; and that the deterrent benefits realizable from the rule's application
in federal habeas corpus proceedings are outweighed by the attendant social
costs. These premises provide theoretical underpinnings for the exception that
permits habeas corpus litigation of a fourth amendment claim in the absence
of an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" in the state courts. Although
the intent of the exception is not entirely clear, it is best construed as enabling
lower federal courts to ensure that the states and their courts take seriously
their constitutional obligation to effectuate the fourth amendment rights of
the people. Accordingly, the cognizability of fourth amendment exclusionary
rule claims in federal habeas corpus actions should depend on whether the
alleged error is likely to have an adverse impact on the effectuation of fourth
amendment values. Finally, the doctrinal justification of Stone advanced here
is consistent with the Court's subsequent refusal in Rose v. Mitchell to limit
habeas corpus litigation of grand jury discrimination claims and provides a
framework for determining whether judicial curtailment of habeas corpus
litigation of other constitutional claims is authorized or prudent.
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